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AHITCHHIKER'S GUIDE TO REFORM OF
THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT LIMITATION*
Robert J. Peroni**
HE purpose of this short article is to provide a few comments on
what should be done in the nature of reform of the foreign tax
credit limitation in U.S. international tax law.' This article is in-
tended to lay the groundwork for a later, more detailed article on foreign
tax credit limitation reform.2
I. THE PURPOSE OF THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT IS TO
MITIGATE INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION
AND THE DESIGN OF THE LIMITATION
SHOULD BE CONSISTENT
WITH THAT PURPOSE
Let's start with the basics. The purpose of the foreign tax credit is to
mitigate international double taxation and prevent such double taxation
from discouraging efficiency enhancing cross-border transactions from
taking place. Its function is not, and should not be, to provide a subsidy
for foreign investment by U.S. persons, to favor foreign investment over
domestic investment or vice versa, or to favor any particular type of for-
eign investment over any other type of foreign investment.
Arguments by some multinational corporations and their tax advisers
that the foreign tax credit provisions should be designed to promote the
"competitiveness" of U.S. multinationals in the global economy are es-
sentially claims that the U.S. tax system should subsidize foreign-source
income by taxing it more lightly than domestic-source income. Those ar-
guments have little to do with the fundamental purpose of the foreign tax
credit provisions, which is to provide unilateral double taxation relief by
the residence country. Moreover, these arguments in favor of skewing
the foreign tax credit provisions in favor of "competitiveness" are often
* Copyright © 2002 by Robert J. Peroni. All rights reserved.
** Robert Kramer Research Professor of Law, George Washington University; J.
Landis Martin Visiting Professor of Law and Business, Northwestern University. The au-
thor would like to thank J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. and Christopher Hanna for their comments
on an earlier draft of this commentary.
1. See I.R.C. § 904 (2002). For a detailed discussion of the foreign tax credit limita-
tion provisions in § 904, see JOEL D. KUNrz & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION T B4.16 (1992).
2. The later article will be co-authored with my frequent co-authors, J. Clifton Flem-
ing, Jr. and Stephen Shay, and will be presented at an upcoming Annual Tax Seminar for
the Government, co-sponsored by New York University School of Law and Tax Analysts.
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made with rather unconvincing empirical support for the claim that the
foreign tax credit provisions of current law in fact are causing competitive
harm to U.S. multinationals. 3 Those who argue in favor of using the for-
eign tax credit provisions as a subsidy for foreign investment by U.S. mul-
tinationals bear the heavy burden of demonstrating (1) the need for such
a subsidy; (2) why finite U.S. government budgetary resources should be
devoted to subsidizing U.S. multinationals instead of providing additional
support to health care, education, environmental protection, anti-terror-
ism measures, national defense, or other government expenditures; and
(3) that the foreign tax credit provisions are the appropriate vehicle for
implementing a subsidy to U.S. multinationals.
The foreign tax credit performs its job properly when it allows a U.S.
taxpayer a dollar-for-dollar credit for foreign income taxes imposed on a
particular item of foreign-source income up to the pre-credit U.S. tax on
that income item.4 If a foreign country imposes a tax at a rate below the
U.S. tax rate, the United States, as the residence country, has the right to
collect a residual tax on the foreign-source income in accordance with
international tax norms. Indeed, to the extent that the U.S. tax exceeds
the foreign tax, there is no double taxation (only taxation by the United
States, the residence country) and, hence, no need for double taxation
relief. If a foreign country imposes tax at a rate above the U.S. rate, no
credit should be allowed for the foreign tax in excess of the U.S. rate
because, again, to that extent there is no double taxation (only taxation
by the source country). Moreover, the only way to provide a foreign tax
credit for foreign taxes in excess of the U.S. rate is to allow an offset of
the excess foreign tax against either U.S. residual tax on low-taxed for-
eign income or U.S. tax on U.S.-source income. This approach would
erode the U.S. tax base because the United States would be forgoing ei-
ther its tax on U.S.-source income or its residual tax on foreign-source
income in order to subsidize investment in foreign countries with tax
rates above the U.S. rate. 5 Thus, if the foreign tax credit were designed
to accomplish its purpose of providing double taxation relief and do noth-
3. See, e.g., THE NFTC, FOREIGN INCOME PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: PART Two: RELIEF OF INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION 301-
09 (2001) (making a valiant, but ultimately unpersuasive, attempt to demonstrate the nega-
tive effect of the U.S. international tax rules on the competitiveness of U.S. multinational
corporations).
4. Foreign taxes imposed on income that the United States treats as U.S.-source in-
come in accordance with the principles of international tax law should not be eligible for
the foreign tax credit. Such taxes should be treated by the U.S. tax system the same as any
other cost of generating income-namely, as a deductible expense under § 162 (or § 212 if
the activity giving rise to the income is an income-producing activity that is not a trade or
business for federal income tax purposes). Disputes between the United States and a for-
eign country concerning the proper source rule for a particular type of income are best
handled through the treaty negotiation process.
5. See also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL
STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, JCS-3-01,
2 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMI'FEE ON TAXATION TO SIM-
PLIFY THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM 389 (Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter RECOMMENDA-
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ing more, the foreign tax credit limitation would be applied on an item-
by-item basis and no cross-crediting of excess foreign tax against U.S.
residual tax would be allowed.
Because it is thought that an item-by-item application of the foreign tax
credit limitation is not administratively feasible,6 the foreign tax credit
limitation has historically been applied among categories of foreign-
source income. The least refined limitation under this approach is one
based on overall foreign-source income and such a limitation allows a
great deal of cross-crediting of high and low taxes on different types of
foreign-source income. The limitation in current U.S. law is one based on
categories of income (often called "baskets") in § 904(d), but despite the
seeming rigor of these basket limitations, liberal cross-crediting is still al-
lowed for foreign taxes imposed on most types of foreign business income
in the residual or general limitation basket. 7 A loose limitation which
allows liberal cross-crediting creates a strong incentive for taxpayers to
shift both active and passive income to low-tax foreign jurisdictions. Any
serious reform of the foreign tax credit limitation should reduce the op-
portunities for cross-crediting, or averaging, of high and low foreign taxes
with respect to all types of foreign-source income, including foreign busi-
ness income.
II. REFORM WILL NOT PRODUCE A SIMPLE FOREIGN
TAX CREDIT LIMITATION
Simplification is an important objective of tax reform efforts. Sensible
simplification of the foreign tax credit rules should include an expansion
of the de minimis rule in current § 904(j), which makes the foreign tax
credit limitation inapplicable to U.S. individual taxpayers with relatively
small dollar amounts of foreign tax credits. These individuals should not
be forced to deal with the complications of the foreign tax credit limita-
tion, not even the comparatively simple overall limitation. The potential
for abuse in such cases is small and the costs in terms of administrative
expense for the IRS and compliance cost for the taxpayer exceed the ben-
efits of applying the limitation in such cases. Accordingly, the de minimis
rule in § 9040) is a sensible rule but should be broadened a bit. The
ceiling on the creditable foreign taxes that an individual taxpayer may
have and still qualify for the de minimis rule should be raised from $300
($600 in the case of a joint return) 8 to some higher amount, such as $1,000
TIONS] (describing this phenomenon as having "the effect of using U.S. tax collected from
domestic income to subsidize the revenue requirements of a foreign jurisdiction").
6. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNA-
TIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION 319-20 (1987).
7. See I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(I) (2002).
8. The de minimis rule should continue to be limited to individual taxpayers in order
to preserve its simplification potential and avoid abuse of the rule by a single individual
conducting her foreign activities through multiple corporate entities. If corporations were
given access to the de minimis rule, an aggregation rule for corporate groups would be
necessary to prevent the preceding abuse and such a rule would be contrary to the simplifi-
cation objective of § 9040).
2003]
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($2,000 in the case of a joint return). Moreover, consideration should be
given to eliminating the requirement that the individual's foreign-source
income consist only of "qualified passive income" and instead allow cred-
itable foreign taxes on any type of foreign-source income to qualify for
the de minimis rule. This would mean that a U.S. individual who is within
the de minimis ceiling would qualify for the de minimis rule by disclosing
on his or her return the amount of creditable taxes for which the de
minimis rule is claimed, the country to which the taxes were paid, and the
nature of the income on which the foreign taxes were imposed.
On the other hand, for taxpayers with large amounts of foreign tax
credits who engage in complicated cross-border transactions, the credit
limitation is probably not going to be simple. Complicated transactions
create the need for complicated tax rules and complicated abuse transac-
tions are likely to lead to complicated anti-abuse rules.9 Moreover, inter-
national transactions involve the application and interplay of the tax rules
of multiple foreign countries, itself a significant contributing factor to the
complexity of the U.S. international tax system. Then, at the end of the
day, all one can reasonably expect in terms of simplification of the foreign
tax credit limitation for taxpayers other than individuals qualifying for
the de minimis rule is that the limitation not be unnecessarily complicated
given its objectives: (1) to mitigate international double taxation; but (2)
not to subsidize countries who impose taxes in excess of the U.S. tax rate;
and (3) to reduce the incentive for taxpayers to make tax-motivated deci-
sions concerning the location of business and investment activities. Ac-
cordingly, as in other areas of the tax law, the goal of simplification of the
foreign tax credit limitation has to be balanced with the goals of making
the foreign tax credit rules more equitable and economically efficient.
Stated differently, the simplest foreign tax credit limitation is not necessa-
rily the optimal foreign tax credit limitation from a tax policy point of
view since the simplest limitation may result in erosion of the U.S. tax
base and lead to tax-motivated cross-border investments that take advan-
tage of cross-crediting opportunities.
III. ADOPT A PER-COUNTRY LIMITATION
The most significant issue concerning foreign tax credit limitation de-
sign relates to how the limitation is to be broken down and applied. The
current limitation in § 904(d) breaks down a taxpayer's foreign-source
taxable income into various categories but then applies on an overall ba-
sis within each category. It is complex and still permits too much cross-
crediting or averaging in the general or residual basket. A better ap-
proach would be a foreign tax credit limitation that sorts out a taxpayer's
foreign-source taxable income on a country-by-country basis, with two
9. Stated differently, the extensive and sophisticated tax planning efforts in the inter-
national tax arena are themselves a considerable source of complexity in the U.S. interna-
tional tax rules.
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categories per country: a passive basket and a residual basket. 10 How-
ever, the passive basket of current law, when applied on a per-country
basis, could be considerably simplified by eliminating the special rules for
export financing interest1 and eliminating any need for having a high-tax
kickout.' 2 Moreover, no special categories for high withholding tax inter-
est, 13 shipping income,14 or financial services income' 5 would be neces-
sary in a limitation applied on a per-country basis, thus eliminating the
definitional and coordination issues that those three basket limitations
generate under current law.
Applying the foreign tax credit limitation on a country-by-country basis
prevents a U.S. taxpayer from cross-crediting high foreign taxes on for-
eign business income in one foreign country with low foreign taxes on
foreign business income in another foreign country, thereby removing the
tax incentive for a U.S. taxpayer with operations in a high tax foreign
country from shifting other operations from the United States or other
foreign countries to a low-tax foreign country. Stated differently, the per-
country limitation does a better job of ensuring that the foreign tax credit
limit performs its principal function of providing double taxation relief
without distorting economic behavior. The reason for the passive basket
in the per-country limitation is to remove any tax incentive for taxpayers
to shift easily mobile passive investments to foreign countries that tax
business income at rates above the U.S. rate and passive income at low or
zero rates.
10. In 1984 and 1985, the Reagan Administration proposed the enactment of a per-
country foreign tax credit limitation as part of its major tax reform effort. See 2 U.S.
TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 360-63
(1984); U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR
FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 385-96 (1985). Congress, however, did not enact this
proposal as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in part because it viewed the per-country
limitation as adding complexity to the federal income tax system. See, e.g., ALI FEDERAL
INCOME TAX PROJECT, supra note 6, at 323-26, 328. Instead, in 1986, Congress enacted the
expanded basket limitation system in § 904(d). One could well argue that the per-country
limitation is not significantly more complicated than the basket limitations in § 904(d),
particularly as applied in conjunction with the look-through rules in § 904(d)(3) (enacted
in 1986) and § 904(d)(4) (enacted in 1997).
11. See I.R.C. § 904(d)(2)(A)(iii)(II), (d)(2)(G) (2002); see also I.R.C. § 904(d)(2)(C)
(iii)(III) (2002). There is scant empirical evidence that these special rules for export fi-
nancing interest have any significant effect on stimulating U.S. exports; accordingly, they
provide nothing more than a windfall (i.e., a wasteful subsidy) to those taxpayers to whom
they apply. Moreover, they arguably are export subsidies that violate the spirit of the
United States's obligations under the WTO agreements. Accordingly, even if the basket
limitation system of current law is retained (instead of being replaced by a per-country
limitation), the tax policy objectives of simplification and efficiency would be promoted by
repealing these provisions.
12. See I.R.C. § 904(d)(2)(A)(iii)(III), (d)(2)(F) (2002). The high-tax kickout in the
passive basket greatly complicates the application of § 904(d) under current law.
13. I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(B) (2002).
14. I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(D), (d)(2)(D) (2002).




In the context of the foreign tax credit limitation, the source rules of
current law need to be revised to reflect the purpose for which they are
being applied. The current rules all too often allow income that is not
taxed (and is not likely to be taxed) by a foreign country to be treated as
foreign-source income, thereby inflating the taxpayer's foreign tax credit
limitation. Instead, as Steve Shay, Cliff Fleming, and I have argued else-
where, income should be treated as foreign-source income for purposes
of the foreign tax credit limitation only if it is subject to a substantial tax
by a foreign country that is consistent with international norms for assert-
ing source-based taxing jurisdiction.' 6 This means, for example, that to
the extent that income is exempt from foreign taxation by reason of a
U.S. income tax treaty it should not be treated as foreign-source income
for purposes of the foreign tax credit limitation.' 7 This also means that
the inventory export source rule in § 861(a)(6) and § 862(a)(6) should be
replaced with a rule that treats a U.S. person's inventory sales income as
U.S.-source income, unless the taxpayer maintains a foreign office to
which the inventory sale is attributable and pays an income tax of a speci-
fied percentage.' 8
V. FOREIGN TAX CREDIT REFORM AND DEFERRAL
In order to reform the foreign tax credit limitation, it is also necessary
to do something about the deferral privilege. Under the deferral privi-
lege, a U.S. person who conducts business abroad through a foreign cor-
poration defers U.S. income tax on the corporation's foreign-source
earnings until those earnings are repatriated to the United States through
distributions to the U.S. shareholder.' 9 This deferral privilege is subject
to a number of weak anti-deferral regimes that eliminate deferral only in
limited circumstances. 20 By contrast, a U.S. person who conducts busi-
ness abroad through an unincorporated branch or through a pass-through
entity (e.g., partnership or limited liability) pays current U.S. tax on the
16. See Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, The David R.
Tillinghast Lecture: "What's Source Got to Do With It?"-Source and U.S. International
Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81 (2002).
17. See Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with Disparate Tax
Systems, 81 VA. L, REV. 1753, 1775 (1995) (suggesting that treaty-protected income of U.S.
persons that would be treated as foreign-source income under the U.S. tax law source rules
should be placed in its own foreign tax credit limitation category so that it cannot be
blended with other high-taxed foreign-source income).
18. See I.R.C. § 865(e)(1) (2002) (providing an example of such a source rule, al-
though the 10% threshold is probably too low).
19. See, e.g., CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD
PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 20-21, 399-400 (2d ed. 2001). At the
time that the foreign corporation distributes the dividend to the U.S. shareholder, the U.S.
shareholder may be entitled to an indirect credit under § 902 for foreign income taxes paid
by the foreign corporation if the shareholder is a U.S. corporation owning at least 10% of
the voting stock of the foreign corporation.
20. Id.
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foreign-source income, subject to a foreign tax credit for qualifying for-
eign income taxes imposed on such income.
The deferral privilege should be thought of as a subsidy for foreign
investment in low-tax foreign countries, which encourages taxpayers to
shift their business and investment activities to low-tax foreign countries.
The combination of the benefits of deferral and the still rather liberal
cross-crediting permitted under § 904(d) may well result in a negative
U.S. tax rate on a U.S. taxpayer's foreign-source income earned through
a foreign subsidiary. In other words, the U.S. taxpayer is often provided
with a lower effective rate of U.S. tax than the zero rate of tax on foreign-
source income imposed by an explicit exemption system.2 1 Numerous at-
tempts to tinker with the anti-deferral regimes of current law have failed
to do much to eliminate this deferral privilege and yet have added great
complexity to the tax system.
As my co-authors and I have vigorously argued elsewhere, it is time to
seriously consider eliminating deferral altogether by imposing a pass-
through regime on U.S. shareholders' ownership interests in foreign cor-
porations, at least with respect to U.S. shareholders owning 10% or more
of the stock of the foreign corporation.2 2 If this proposal were adopted,
the subpart F provisions of current law could be repealed, as well as the
indirect credit provisions of § 902 and § 960. No indirect credit would be
needed since 10-percent-or-more U.S. shareholders would pay current
tax on their pro rata share of the foreign corporation's taxable income
and would obtain a direct credit under § 901 for any foreign income taxes
imposed on the foreign corporation's foreign-source income.23
VI. ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX
One complicating feature of our income tax system generally, and the
foreign tax credit provisions in particular, is the alternative minimum tax
provisions. They create a second, complicated income tax system con-
taining its own rules and rates, which stands side-by-side with the regular
tax provisions. The existence of this alternative minimum tax system is an
admission by Congress of its inability to design a regular tax system that
accurately measures a taxpayer's net income. As persuasively argued by
others, a strong case can be made for repeal of the alternative minimum
tax provisions, particularly as they apply to individual taxpayers.
24
21. See HARRY GRUBERT & JOHN Mu'Iri, TAXING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN-
COME: DIVIDEND EXEMPTION VERSUS THE CURRENT SYSTEM 12-13 (2001).
22. See Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S.
International Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 975, 989-90 (1997); J. Clifton Flem-
ing, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, An Alternative View of Deferral: Considering
a Proposal to Curtail, Not Expand, Deferral, 20 TAX NOTES INT'L 547 (2000); Robert J.
Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Defer-
ral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455 (1999).
23. See, e.g., Peroni, supra note 22, at 990.
24. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Tax Simplification and the Alternative Minimum Tax, 91
TAX NOTES 1455 (2001); RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5, at 13-16 (recommending the
repeal of both the individual and corporate alternative minimum tax provisions on the
2003]
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The special provisions in the alternative minimum tax dealing with the
foreign tax credit add complexity to the U.S. international tax system and
are inconsistent with the policy underlying the foreign tax credit of miti-
gating international double taxation. The 90-percent limit on the foreign
tax credit in § 59(a)(2) is arbitrary and results in the double taxation of a
U.S. taxpayer's foreign-source income in contravention of the policy un-
derlying the foreign tax credit provisions. It undercuts, rather than effec-
tuates, the accurate measurement of a U.S. taxpayer's appropriate
income tax liability. Accordingly, even if Congress decides not to repeal
the individual and corporate alternative minimum tax provisions,
§ 59(a)(2) and the other special provisions in the alternative minimum tax
provisions relating to a U.S. taxpayer's foreign tax credits2 5 should be
eliminated. 26
VII. CONCLUSION
This brief article presents two main points. First, in the context of the
foreign tax credit limitation provisions, as in other areas of the tax law,
simplification cannot be undertaken without considering other tax policy
objectives such as fairness and efficiency. Stated differently, international
tax reform and international tax simplification are not synonymous.
Thus, for example, the overall limitation may be the simplest type of for-
eign tax credit limitation (other than none at all); however, it is objection-
able from an efficiency point of view because (as explained above) it
distorts economic behavior by providing an incentive for taxpayers to
make tax-motivated decisions concerning the geographical location of
their business and investment activities. Repealing the basket limitations
in § 904(d) and replacing them with an overall limitation might well
achieve some element of tax simplification but only at the price of signifi-
cant efficiency losses. Second, achieving reform and sensible simplifica-
tion of the foreign tax credit provision requires work on the other defects
in the U.S. international tax rules, such as the complex and largely inef-
fective anti-deferral rules of current law.
grounds that they are complex and do not necessarily accurately measure a taxpayer's net
income).
25. See I.R.C. § 59(a) (2002).
26. See Peroni, supra note 22, at 1001-02.
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